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Abstract 
The determinants of R&D are an important topic of industrial economics. The classical 
Schumpeterian hypotheses about the influence of size and market power have been 
complemented with the role played by industry determinants, such as demand pull, 
technological opportunity and appropriability, in determining R&D investments. 
However, R&D has always been considered as a whole, even though research and 
development are different activities with different purposes, knowledge bases, people 
involved and management styles. We take advantage of a new panel database of 
innovative Spanish firms (PITEC) to distinguish between research and development 
efforts of firms. We analyze the role jointly played by traditional R&D determinants in 
driving research and development, accounting for the differences between both 
activities. Results show that demand pull and appropriability have a higher effect on 
development, while technological opportunity is more influential for research. 
Differences are statistically significant, important in magnitude, and robust to the use of 
different indicators for demand pull, technological opportunity and appropriability and 
to several robustness checks. 
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1. Introduction 
A central question in the field of industrial economics is the analysis of the factors 
leading firms to invest in R&D activities. These activities foster technological progress, 
and hence they are primary sources of economic growth and welfare (Levin et al., 1987; 
Cohen and Levin, 1989).  
Literature on R&D determinants has mainly focused on two types of factors. The first is 
the so called “Schumpeterian hypotheses” and is focused on the effects of size and 
market power on R&D expenditures. The second type of factors includes more 
fundamental determinants of inter-industry R&D activities (Levin et al, 1985; Cohen 
and Levin, 1989), such as demand pull, technological opportunity and appropriability. 
There is considerable amount of debate in the literature about the role played by these 
determinants, with theoretical works providing contrasting views and inconclusive 
empirical evidence. Regarding the empirical literature, previous works show two 
important shortcomings. First, researchers have failed to take systematic account of all 
the fundamental sources of variation in R&D behavior in firms and industries (Cohen 
and Levin, 1989). They have usually performed partial analyses focused on specific 
determinants of R&D, such as size (Cohen and Klepper, 1996), competition (Aghion et 
al, 2005), demand pull (Piva and Vivarelli, 2007), technological opportunity (Klevorick 
et al, 1995) or appropriability (Lerner, 2009). Omission of important and potentially 
correlated explanatory variables, such as the rest of determinants proposed, may explain 
the contradictory empirical results (Cohen and Levin, 1989). 
A second limitation of this literature is the assumption that R&D is a homogenous 
activity (Cohen and Levin, 1989). However, research and development are two different 
activities that differ in purposes, knowledge bases, people involved and management 
styles (Barge-Gil and López, 2011). More precisely, the main purpose of research is to 
acquire new knowledge, while the main purpose of development is directed to the 
introduction of new or improved products or processes (OECD, 2005)., Research is 
more theoretical in nature (although usually oriented to some practical objective) and is 
based on analytical knowledge. Development is essentially applied and based on a 
synthetic knowledge (Asheim and Coenen, 2005). Research needs specialized human 
capital working relatively independently of the rest of the organization and without 
much hierarchy, while development shows clear hierarchy and needs generalists able to 
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coordinate with other functional units of the organization (Leifer and Triscari, 1987; 
Chiesa and Frattini, 2007). As a consequence, these activities are increasingly carried 
out in different departments, even located in distant places (Chiesa, 2001). 
The aim of this paper is to extend previous empirical literature on the determinants of 
R&D by jointly analyzing the differentiated effect of the relevant factors involved on 
research and development efforts. By doing this, we take a step towards solving some of 
the debates raised by previous literature.  
We take advantage of a large panel database for Spanish firms that follows the 
recommendations of the Frascati and Olso Manuals (OCDE, 2002; 2005), and provides 
detailed information about firms’ R&D activities, allowing for differentiation between 
research and development expenditures. It also provides very detailed information about 
innovation activities so that indicators for the different determinants proposed in the 
literature can be defined. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes previous research on 
the determinants of R&D and elaborates on their different influence on research and 
development. Section 3 describes the data used and the sample of firms. Section 4 sets 
out a framework for the analysis, describing the econometric details, estimation method 
applied and the variables used in estimation. Section 5 presents the results. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Previous literature 
2.1. Schumpeterian hypotheses 
From an industrial economics perspective, most of the earlier works in the field of 
innovation have focused on testing the ‘so-called’ Schumpeterian hypotheses: (i) R&D 
activity increases more than proportionately with firm size, and (ii) R&D activity 
increases with market concentration (Cohen and Levin 1989).  
Regarding the influence of size, several arguments have been put forward to explain a 
positive relationship between size and R&D. For example, market capital imperfections 
confer an advantage to large firms as they have more internal funds at their disposal. In 
addition, R&D is subject to minimum project size so that small firms are prevented to 
make such investments (Galbraith, 1952) and the existence of economies of scale makes 
larger investments more profitable. A related reason is the existence of economies of 
4 
 
scope. The availability of complementary assets in large firms (such as marketing or 
financial resources) will confer them an advantage in carrying out R&D activities 
(Cohen and Levin, 1989). Finally, R&D is risky and many projects fail, so that large 
firms will be able to spread risks over different projects while smaller firms should 
focus on one or a few projects only (Rammer et al, 2009).  
However, as pointed out by Cohen et al (1987), the above arguments depend on 
assumptions about the nature and magnitude of transaction and adjustment costs which 
are rarely tested. Moreover, arguments can also be found supporting that small firms 
would invest more (in relative terms) in R&D than large firms. For example, one 
argument is that small firms would be more efficient in performing R&D because they 
do not suffer from lack of managerial control as large firms do (Holmstrom, 1989). 
Another argument is that incentives of individual scientists and entrepreneurs would be 
greater in small firms as they will have more possibilities to benefit from the results of 
their work.  
The empirical evidence, although still subject to some degree of controversy, have 
resulted on some stylised facts (Cohen and Klepper 1996; Cohen, 2010): (i) the 
probability of a firm reporting positive R&D effort increases with firm size, (ii) within 
industries and among R&D performers, R&D rises monotically with firm size across all 
firm size ranges, and (iii) among R&D performing firms, in most industries there is not 
a systematic relationship between firm size and elasticity of R&D with respect to firm 
size across the full range of firm sizes. 
Concerning the effect of market power, several arguments justify the belief that more ex 
ante market power would be associated with more R&D investment. First, Schumpeter 
(1942) argues that an ex ante oligopolistic market structure made rival behaviour more 
predictable, thus reducing uncertainty associated with excessive rivalry that undermines 
the incentive to invest. Second, ex ante market power leads to profits to finance 
innovation. Finally, Schumpeter also argues that in oligopolistic markets firms could 
better appropriate the results of their investments.  
On the other hand, some authors (see, for example, Arrow, 1962) claim that innovation 
would partially displace oligopolistic rents, thus reducing incentives to innovate of 
firms with higher market power. Others authors (Scherer, 1980; Porter, 1990) argue that 
isolation from competitive pressures could lead to bureaucratic inertia and discourages 
innovation while active pressure from rivals stimulates innovation. 
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From an empirical point of view, results are mixed. Some authors have obtained a 
positive influence of market power on innovation (Crepon et al, 1998; Blundell et al, 
1999), while others authors have found a negative one (Geroski, 1990; Harris et al, 
2003). As a third possibility, Aghion et al (2005) find that the relationship between 
product market competition and innovation is an inverted U-shape. In a recent study for 
the Spanish case, Artes (2009) finds that several different indicators of market 
concentration positively affect the long term decision of investing on R&D but not the 
short run one. All in all, what emerges from previous empirical evidence is that market 
power does not play an important, independent role in affecting R&D (Cohen, 2010). 
Theoretical literature suggests that the empirical evidence is not conclusive because the 
type of R&D has not been considered. In this sense, some theoretical work has been 
devoted to understand how firm size and market power affect the type of R&D 
performed. Cohen and Klepper (1996a,b) propose that cost spreading advantage of large 
firms constitutes an incentive to carry out more incremental projects. Rosen (1991) 
extends the argument arguing that larger firms can gain relatively more from safer and 
more incremental R&D projects because they magnify their existing competitive 
advantage. Kwon (2009) finds that more competition increases the relative expenditure 
in risky and long term projects but decreases the relative expenditure in basic projects. 
Finally, Cabral (2003) finds that firms with low market power perform riskier R&D 
projects. These results are consistent with some empirical evidence showing that larger 
and incumbent firm tend to pursue relatively more incremental innovation, while small 
firms with low market power carry out riskier and more radical projects (Christensen 
and Bower, 1996; Cohen, 2010). 
2.2. Demand, technology opportunity and appropriability 
A series of papers in the late eighties (Levin et al, 1985; Cohen et al, 1987; Cohen and 
Levin, 1989; Geroski, 1990) criticises the emphasis on the Schumpeterian hypotheses 
and recommends to pay more attention to other more industry-specific determinants of 
R&D, such as demand, technology opportunity and appropriability. 
First, the seminal works by Schmookler (1962; 1966) points out the critical importance 
of demand as a driver of innovation. The Schmookler’s underlying assumption is that a 
common pool of knowledge and capabilities is available to all industries, and therefore 
large and growing markets provides higher incentives to invest in innovation as these 
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markets offer higher returns for the investment (Cohen and Levin, 1989). Some 
empirical studies support this view (Cohen et al, 1987; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 
1989), although this support is not as strong as Schmookler thought (Kleinknecht and 
Verspagen, 1990; Piva and Vivarelli, 2005). 
The effect of demand pull on the type of R&D is an under-researched topic. As 
development is more focused on adapting knowledge to user needs (Leifer and Triscari, 
1987), more conducive to new products and more short-term oriented (Barge-Gil and 
López, 2011), it may be more responsive to market changes. Some indirect evidence of 
this closer relationship between development and demand pull could be derived from 
the higher internalization of development (compared to research) in multinational 
organizations, driven by the desire to match local regulations, standards and tastes (von 
Zedtwitz and Gassman, 2002). 
Second, technological opportunities comprise the set of possibilities for advancing the 
knowledge frontier and may be measured in terms of the distribution of values of 
improved production-function or product-attribute parameters that may be attained 
through R&D or, alternatively, as the distribution of returns to R&D, given demand 
conditions and the appropriability regime (Klevorick et al, 1995). That is, at prevailing 
input prices, innovation is “easier” (less costly) in some industries than in others (Cohen 
and Levin, 1989), so that, more R&D should be found in these industries. Some authors, 
however, argue that its influence over technological input is not clear. The reason is that 
technological opportunity may raise the average product of R&D without raising its 
marginal product, and therefore technological opportunity may not increase R&D 
investment (Klevorick et al, 1995). Empirical studies have found mixed results for 
technological opportunities (Cohen et al, 1987; Griliches et al, 1991). 
Again, the relationship between opportunities and the type of R&D is an under-
researched topic. On the one hand, the absorptive capacity theory (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990) suggests that own research is crucial to benefit from knowledge advances by 
external parties, suggesting that higher external opportunities may have a greater effect 
on research rather than on development. Indirect evidence supporting this hypothesis 
can be found in the internalization patterns of R&D: Research (rather than development) 
units are located abroad to access frontier knowledge generated in excellence centres 
(von Zedtwitz and Gassman, 2002). On the other hand, scientific opportunities have a 
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higher effect in increasing the productivity of the more applied R&D projects (Nelson, 
1982).  
Third, appropriability issues are also of importance. Firms should be able to appropriate 
returns sufficient to make their investment worthwhile (Levin et al, 1987). However, it 
should not be taken for granted that more appropriability is related to more innovation 
effort (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Lerner, 2009). Many 
innovations are cumulative and build on previous results achieved by other firms. If 
these are appropriable, then further innovation investment may be reduced (Nelson, 
2006). In addition, the higher the appropriability is, the lower the spillovers are, and 
therefore R&D investment to absorb them would be reduced (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990). Finally, if knowledge is complementary, then 
spillovers raise the marginal product of own R&D (Levin and Reiss, 1988). 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between appropriability and R&D is not 
conclusive. Some empirical studies have not found a significant effect of appropriability 
on R&D intensity (Levin et al, 1985), while others find a positive effect only for some 
industries (see, for example, Mansfield et al, 1981; and Mansfield, 1986).  
Taking into account the type of R&D may help to find more conclusive evidence. 
Kortum and Lerner (1999) suggest that increasing appropriability shifts the innovation 
activities away from pure research towards more applied, easier to appropriate, 
activities. Moreover, increasing appropriability may block new lines of research if 
proprietary pieces of previous knowledge are required. Accordingly, a higher level of 
appropriability should increase development expenses while its effect on research 
expenses is unclear. 
3. Data and sample of firms 
We use information from the Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC). The PITEC is a 
statistical instrument for studying the innovation activities of Spanish firms over time. 
The data base is developed by the INE (The National Statistics Institute). The data come 
from the Spanish Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The CIS questionnaire draws 
from a long tradition of research on innovation, including the Yale survey and the 
SPRU innovation database (Laursen and Salter, 2006) and it follows guidelines in the 
Oslo Manual (OCDE, 2005). In addition, the Spanish version of the CIS includes a 
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much more detailed questionnaire in some aspects of firms’ innovation processes, 
following guidelines in the Frascati Manual (OCDE, 2002). 
The data base is placed at the disposal of researchers on the FECYT web site.1 The 
PITEC contains information for a panel of more than 12,000 firms since 2003. The 
PITEC consists of several subsamples, the most important of which are a sample of 
firms with intramural R&D expenditures and a sample of firms with 200 or more 
employees and. Both subsamples have quite broad coverage. A more detailed 
description can be found on the FECYT web site. 
The PITEC has three main advantages for this study. Firstly and most important, this 
data base has detailed information about firms’ R&D activities. Specifically, it allows 
the differentiation between research and development expenditures. This information, 
seldom available, is essential to this study. 
Secondly, the PITEC is a CIS-type data base. CIS data are widely used by policy 
observers to provide innovation indicators and trend analyses and by economists to 
analyze a variety of topics related to innovation (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; 
Raymond et al., 2010; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011). Therefore, throughout this study, 
we use widely accepted innovation indicators and variables. For a review of CIS-based 
studies, see, for example, van Beers et al. (2008), and Mairesse and Mohnen (2010). 
Thirdly, the PITEC is designed as a panel data survey. This fact allows us to mitigate 
many of the problems related to studies using CIS data, such as the simultaneity 
between input and outputs, by lagging explanatory variables. 
Sample of firms 
In this paper, we use information from the PITEC for the period 2005-2009,2 and we 
restrict our attention to manufacturing firms.3 Moreover, our analysis is conducted for 
firms with positive expenditures in R&D activities for at least one year during the 
period 2005-2009. Hence, this article is focused on the analysis of firms with experience 
                                                 
1 http://icono.fecyt.es/pitec/Paginas/por_que.aspx. To observe confidentiality, an anonymized version of 
the data is available on the web site.  The anonymization procedure applied at the PITEC is described on 
the web page. 
2 Because of enlargements of the sample of firms performing intramural R&D in 2004 and 2005, we do 
not use the data for the years 2003 and 2004. 
3 R&D performed by manufacturing and service firms shows many differences (see, for example, Sirilli 
and Evangelista, 1998). 
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in engaging in R&D activities. The final sample used includes 4,843, 4,811, 4,616, 
4,474 and 4,288 firms for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively (see 
Table 1).  
Table 1 shows firms performing R&D (at least one activity), firms performing both 
research and development, firms performing only research and firms performing only 
development during the period 2005-2009.4  
An interesting finding is that less than half of the firms perform both research and 
development and this percentage is decreasing in time. This finding highlights the 
importance of carrying out a differentiated analysis of research and development. They 
are different activities and, in fact, more than half of firms only perform one of them. 
With respect to firms specialized in one activity, firms performing only development 
activities are more common than those performing only research. The percentage of 
firms specialized in each activity is increasing in time. 
 
Table 1. Sample Statistics
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Firms in the sample 4,843 4,811 4,616 4,478 4,288 
Firms with R&D 4,355 3,898 3,534 3,248 2,925 
Firms with both R&D1 1,880 
(43.2%) 
1,649 
(42.3%) 
1,466 
(41.5%) 
1,357 
(41.8%) 
1,153
(39.4%) 
Firms with only R1 1,042
(23.9%) 
910
(23.3%) 
840
(23.8%) 
784 
(24.1%) 
759
(25.9%) 
Firms with only D1 1,433
(32.9%) 
1,339
(34.4%) 
1,228
(34.7%) 
1,107 
(34.1%) 
1,013
(34.6%) 
1 Number of firms and percentage of firms with respect to the number of firms with R&D. 
 
4. A framework for the analysis 
4.1. The basic framework 
As we said in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to analyze the differentiated role 
of the traditionally considered determinants of research and development efforts. 
                                                 
4 As it can be seen, the number of R&D performers decreases during the period 2005-2009 in the whole 
sample. This decrease is mainly due to firms which report performing R&D occasionally. 
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Specifically, we focus on the impact of firm size, market power, demand pull factors, 
technological opportunity and appropriability conditions. 
Variables used 
Our dependent variables are research and development intensities. We define these 
variables as the ratio between research expenditures and number of employees in logs 
(RInt) and the ratio between development expenditures and number of employees in 
logs (DInt).5 
With respect to the explanatory variables employed, firstly, we define firm size (Size) as 
the logarithm of number of employees. Size squared (SizeSq) is considered to allow for 
non-linear elasticity. 
Secondly, we define market power (MarkPower) as the log of share of firm sales in 
total industry sales.6 This indicator of market power using CIS data has been previously 
used by other authors (Hussinger, 2008; Raymond et al., 2010). Again, market power 
squared is considered to allow for non-linear elasticity (MarkPowerSq).  
Thirdly, we measure demand pull (DemPull) by using the mean of innovative sales at 
the industry level. Innovative sales are defined as the weight of total sales from 
innovations new to the firm’s market or new to the firm over total sales. As a robustness 
check, we use an alternative measure for demand pull (DemPull_b) introduced by 
Raymond et al. (2010).  This variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm rates 
at least one of the two following objectives of innovation as “high importance” (highest 
mark on a 0–3 Likert scale): open up new markets and extend product range; and 0 
otherwise. 
Fourthly, as a proxy for technological opportunity (TechOpp), following Raymond et al. 
(2010), we use an industry-level measure of the importance of universities and research 
institutes as sources of information for innovation. In doing this, first we define a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm considers universities or research 
institutes a very important source of information for innovation, and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
5 Specifically, this differentiation between research and development expenditures refers only to current 
R&D expenditures. In our main specification, we assume that these weights can be extended to total R&D 
expenditures (including both current and capital expenditures). In our sample, current R&D expenditures 
account for approximately 80% of total R&D expenditures.  
6 Throughout this paper industry level is defined at 4-digit NACE. 
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Then, we calculate the mean of this dummy variable at the industry level. As a 
robustness check, we use an alternative measure for technological opportunity 
(TechOpp_b): a dummy variable identifying firms belonging to high-tech industries 
according to the OCDE classification of manufacturing industries (see OCDE, 2005).7 
A dummy variable for industries where the vigor of advance of underlying scientific 
and technological knowledge has usually been employed in empirical studies (Cohen 
and Levin, 1989) 
Finally, we measure appropriability (Appr) using the mean of the weight of sales from 
innovations new to the firm’s market over total innovative sales at the industry level. 
Innovative sales include sales from products new to the firm’s market or new to the 
firm. This latter case may be considered the result of imitations of innovations already 
introduced in the firm’s market.  Therefore, the higher the value of this variable is, the 
lower the weight of imitations on total innovative sales at the industry level, and hence, 
the higher the industry level of appropriability of innovation results. Additionally, we 
use information of legal methods for protecting innovation as an indicator of 
appropriability (Appr_b) (see Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005). Specifically, we define 
this variable as the percentage of firms having applied for patents at the industry level. 
Accordingly, the higher this percentage is, the higher the level of legal protection at the 
industry.8  
Econometric specification 
Our starting point is to assume that the determinants previously defined have an impact 
on both research and development, but this impact should be different. Hence, our 
specification is given by the following set of two equations to be estimated: 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 1 7 1                               (1)
it r it r it r it r it
r it r it r it ir itr
RInt Size SizeSq MarkPower MarkPowerSq
Dpull TechOpp Appr
α α α α
α α α µ ε
− − − −
− − −
= + + + +
+ + + +                             
                                                 
7 High-tech industries are the following: aircraft, spacecraft, pharmaceuticals, office machinery, radio and 
TV equipment, and medical and optical instruments. 
8 The main difference between legal protection methods and other methods (e.g. secrecy) is that legal 
methods provide two types of exclusion. First, legal protection prevents other firms from imitating 
innovations. Second, these methods prevents from commercializing their own independent success in the 
same innovations. Secrecy only provides the first type of exclusion. Stronger patent protection increases 
patent propensity, even if secrecy was a preferred alternative when patents protection was weaker. As 
patents protect against independent innovation success of other firms and secrecy does not, incentives for 
innovation diminish (Kwon, 2012). 
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1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 1 7 1                               (2)
it d it d it d it d it
d it d it d it id itd
DInt Size SizeSq MarkPower MarkPowerSq
Dpull TechOpp Appr
α α α α
α α α µ ε
− − − −
− − −
= + + + +
+ + + +  
where subscript i refers to firm, subscript t refers to time. As control variables we also 
include a set of year dummies and a dummy variable identifying those firms performing 
R&D continuously (ContR&D).9 
We use the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach to estimate the system of 
equations given by expressions (1) and (2).10 This approach allows for correlated errors 
across equations. For example, correlation between the errors in equations (1) and (2) 
can arise from omitted variables that we cannot include in the specification. In this 
sense, both research and development can be correlated with unobserved factors. 
In addition, to avoid endogeneity and simultaneity problems, industry-level variables 
for each firm are calculated excluding the firm in question and explanatory variables are 
lagged by one period. Therefore, we explain research and development intensities in 
terms of past firm or industry characteristics. This reduces our sample to an unbalanced 
panel of four years and 17,784 observations.  
4.2. Two-part model 
Dependent variables in equations (1) and (2) can be equal to zero (i.e., firm i at year t 
may not have expenditures in research and/or development activities). Therefore, the 
basic model does not allow us to distinguish between the “performance” decision and 
the “intensity” decision. We deal with this issue by estimating a two-part model. 
First, we analyze the determinants of the decision to undertake research and 
development. In doing this, we define two new dependent variables, specifically, a 
dummy variable identifying those firms undertaking research activities (RDec) and a 
dummy variable identifying those firms undertaking development activities (DDec). 
Now, in this first step, our specification is given by the following two equations: 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 1 7 1                               (3)
it r it r it r it r it
r it r it r it ir itr
RDec Size SizeSq MarkPower MarkPowerSq
Dpull TechOpp Appr
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ ρ θ
− − − −
− − −
= + + + +
+ + + +                             
                                                 
9 We define continuous R&D performers as those firms which present a positive amount spent on R&D 
each year in the period 2005-2009. 
10 For a further discussion of the estimation of a set of SUR equations with panel data, see Baltagi (2005), 
Chapter 6. 
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  1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 1 7 1                               (4)
it d it d it d it d it
d it d it d it id itd
DDec Size SizeSq MarkPower MarkPowerSq
Dpull TechOpp Appr
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ ρ θ
− − − −
− − −
= + + + +
+ + + +  
Again, we estimate equations (3) and (4) using the SUR approach for the whole sample 
of firms. 
Second, we focus on the determinants of research and development intensities 
(equations 1 and 2), restricting our attention to the subsample of firms with positive 
expenditures in both activities. 
5. Results 
In this section, first the basic (one step) model is estimated. We also analyze the 
robustness of the results to different measures of demand pull, technological 
opportunity and appropriability. Next, a two-part model is estimated. Again, different 
robustness checks are presented.   
5.1. Basic specification 
Table 2 shows the estimated marginal effects of the independent variables for basic 
models.  
Size elasticities of research and development intensities decrease with firm size. For 
example, for firms with 20 employees, size elasticities are 0.33 and 0.18 for research 
and development, respectively. These figures are lower (0.03 and 0.02, respectively) for 
firms with 200 employees. Finally, for firms with 1000 employees, an increase in firm 
size implies a decrease in investment (elasticities of -0.17 for research and -0.09 for 
development). However, some caveat should apply to these results. As we said in the 
previous section, the basic specification does not allow us to distinguish between the 
“performance” decision and the “intensity” decision. As we will show when estimating 
the two- part model (see section 4.2), the likelihood of doing any of the investments is 
positively affected by size while the intensity of investments shows an inverted U shape 
relationship with size. 
Market power elasticity of investment shows a different pattern for research and 
development, usually with quite small magnitudes. For research, elasticity is always 
negative, although it tends to zero for higher values of market power. For development, 
however, elasticity is positive for firms with little market power (0.02 for firms with 
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0.1% of industry sales) and negative for firms with great market power (-0.29 for firms 
with 10% of industry sales). 
 
Table 2. Determinants of research and development intensities 
Basic specification
 RInt 
(1)
Dint 
(2)
Size 0.713*** (0.054) 0.387*** (0.054) 
SizeSq -0.064*** (0.006) -0.034*** (0.006) 
MarkPower -0.136*** (0.044) 0.182*** (0.044) 
MarkPowerSq 0.008 (0.005) -0.024*** (0.004) 
DemPull 0.973*** (0.138) 1.758*** (0.140) 
TechOpp 1.718*** (0.177) 0.542*** (0.179) 
Appr 0.419*** (0.083) 1.016*** (0.085) 
ContR&D 2.622*** (0.044) 3.078*** (0.042) 
Year06 0.711*** (0.028) 0.910*** (0.029) 
Year07 0.442*** (0.028) 0.646*** (0.029) 
Year08 0.296*** (0.028) 0.383*** (0.029) 
Observations 17,784 17,784 
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, 
MarkPowerSq, DemPull, TechOpp and Appr across equations (1) and (2) 
allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 
0.01 level. 
 
 
Demand pull shows a positive effect for both research and development, with the 
coefficient for development almost doubling that for research. A movement from the 
lower to the upper quartile of the share of innovative sales in the 4-digit industry is 
associated with an increase in research intensity per employee between 9-16% and with 
an increase of development intensity per employee between 19-26%.11  
Technological opportunity also has a positive effect on both research and development. 
Here, the coefficient for research is three times higher than the coefficient for 
development. A movement from the lower to the upper quartile of the distribution of 
this variable implies an increase in research expenses per employee between 12-18% 
and an increase of development expenses per employee between 2-8%.  
                                                 
11 These effects are calculated using the 95% confidence interval for coefficients. 
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Appropriability also has a positive effect for both research and development, although 
this effect is higher in the case of development intensity. A movement from the lower to 
the upper quartile of the distribution of this variable is associated with an increase in 
research expenses per employee between 4-10% and with an increase of development 
expenses per employee of 14-20%. 
These results are robust to the use of alternative measures for demand pull, technology 
opportunity and appropriability. Table 3 presents these robustness checks.  
When defining an alternative measure for demand pull (DemPull_b), this factor again 
has a positive effect on both research and development, with the coefficient higher for 
development. In this case, the interquartile variation is associated with an increase in 
research expenses per employee between 22-29% and with an increase of development 
expenses per employee between 25-32%.12 
We define a dummy variable identifying high-tech firms as an alternative measure for 
technological opportunity (TechOpp_b). We find that belonging to a high-tech sector 
increases research expenses per employee by 114-139% and development expenses per 
employee by 64-88% (compared to a firm outside the high-tech sector). 
Finally, the alternative measure for appropriability (Appr_b) has a positive effect on 
development intensity. However, this variable loses significance for research intensity. 
The interquartile variation of this variable is associated with an increase of development 
expenses per employee of 25-32%. 
 
                                                 
12 The difference is not statistically significant. This is not surprising as this indicator uses subjective 
valuations, thus introducing measurement error.  
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Table 3. Determinants of research and development intensities. Basic specification
 Alternative variable for Demand Pull Alternative variable for Technological Opportunity  Alternative variable for Appropriability 
 RInt 
(1) 
Dint 
(2)
RInt 
(3)
Dint 
(4)
RInt 
(5)
Dint 
(6)
Size 0.520*** (0.056) 0.239*** (0.055) 0.723*** (0.054) 0.374*** (0.053) 0.768*** (0.053) 0.424*** (0.053) 
SizeSq -0.046*** (0.006) -0.023*** (0.006) -0.068*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.006) -0.069*** (0.006) -0.041*** (0.006) 
MarkPower -0.146*** (0.044) 0.183*** (0.044) -0.066 (0.045) 0.233*** (0.044) -0.123*** (0.044) 0.215*** (0.044) 
MarkPowerSq 0.012** (0.005) -0.020*** (0.004) 0.005 (0.005) -0.026*** (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) -0.024*** (0.004) 
DemPull     0.525*** (0.139) 1.454*** (0.141) 1.016*** (0.140) 1.575*** (0.141) 
DemPull_b 1.467*** (0.097) 1.657*** (0.098)         
TechOpp 1.629*** (0.177) 0.449** (0.179)     1.776*** (0.177) 0.496*** (0.179) 
TechOpp_b     1.267*** (0.064) 0.762*** (0.062)     
Appr 0.334*** (0.083) 0.946*** (0.085) 0.314*** (0.083) 0.934*** (0.085)     
Appr_b         0.007 (0.137) 1.949*** (0.138) 
ContR&D 2.593*** (0.044) 3.055*** (0.042) 2.525*** (0.044) 3.016*** (0.042) 2.627*** (0.044) 3.068*** (0.042) 
Year06 0.722*** (0.028) 0.931*** (0.029) 0.711*** (0.028) 0.909*** (0.029) 0.707*** (0.028) 0.836*** (0.029) 
Year07 0.484*** (0.028) 0.688*** (0.029) 0.438*** (0.028) 0.641*** (0.029) 0.445*** (0.028) 0.609*** (0.029) 
Year08 0.342*** (0.028) 0.423*** (0.029) 0.288*** (0.028) 0.377*** (0.029) 0.307*** (0.028) 0.384*** (0.029) 
Observations 17,784 17,784 17,784 17,784 17,784 17,784 
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, TechOpp and Appr across equations (1) and (2) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of 
equality of coefficients at the 0.01 (Size, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, TechOpp and Appr) and the 0.05 (SizeSq) levels. Test of equality of estimated coefficients of DemPull_b 
across equations (1) and (2) does not allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, DemPull, TechOpp_b and Appr across equations (3) and (4) allow us to reject the null 
hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, DemPull, TechOpp and Appr_b across equations (5) and (6) allow us to reject the null 
hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. 
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5.2. Two-part model 
In this section, we present the estimation of a framework distinguishing between the 
determinants of the decision to invest in research and/or development; and the 
determinants of the intensity of these investments for those firms active in both 
activities. Table 4 shows the results. 
Firm size has a positive and significant effect on the probability of both decisions. For 
firms with 20 employees, a 1% increase in size implies an increase of 6 percentual 
points on the probability of performing research activities and an increase of 5 
percentual points on the probability in the likelihood of performing research activities. 
As expected, the impact of size decreases as size grows, but still remains positive. For 
firms with 200 employees, these figures are 3 percentual points for both research and 
development. For firms with 1,000 employees, a 1% increase in size is associated with 
an increase of 0.5 percentual points on the probability of performing research, while the 
effect on development activities remains higher (2 percentual points).  
In this case, results for the determinants of intensities are quite different. For firms with 
20 employees, size elasticities of intensities are 0.79 and 0.72 for research and 
development, respectively. However, for firms with 200 employees, these figures are     
-0.28 and -0.24. That is, for small firms, an increase in size is associated with an 
increase in both research and development expenses per employee. However, this effect 
reverts as firms grow, the turning point being around 110 employees.13 
Market power has a small (although significant) effect on the probability of both 
decisions. When analyzing intensities, market power has an effect similar to that of firm 
size. For firms with little market power, an increase in this variable is associated with an 
increase in both research and development expenditures per employee. For example, a 
firm whose sales represent 0.1% of its industry sales shows an elasticity of 0.06 for 
research and 0.11 for development. However, this positive effect reverts as firms gain 
market power, the turning point being around 0.3% of sales for research and 0.6% of 
sales for development. 
 
                                                 
13 The first of these results support the Stylized Fact 1 by Cohen and Klepper (1996). However, the 
second one shows new evidence on their stylized facts 2 and 3 by taking account of varying elasticities, 
although in a different level of analysis (inter-industry vs. intra-industry). 
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Table 4. Determinants of research and development
Two part model
 Determinants of R and D decisions Determinants of R and D intensities 
 RDec 
(1) 
DDec 
(2) 
RInt 
(3) 
Dint 
(4) 
Size 0.102*** (0.007) 0.060*** (0.007) 2.188*** (0.039) 1.970*** (0.040) 
SizeSq -0.007*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.233*** (0.004) -0.209*** (0.004) 
MarkPower -0.025*** (0.006) 0.017*** (0.006) 0.187*** (0.032) 0.245*** (0.032) 
MarkPowerSq 0.002*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.027*** (0.003) -0.030*** (0.003) 
DemPull 0.090*** (0.018) 0.177*** (0.018) 1.993*** (0.104) 2.461*** (0.103) 
TechOpp 0.133*** (0.023) 0.010 (0.023) 2.478*** (0.124) 1.509*** (0.123) 
Appr 0.031*** (0.011) 0.084*** (0.011) 1.220*** (0.068) 1.915*** (0.068) 
ContR&D 0.324*** (0.006) 0.379*** (0.005) 0.790*** (0.029) 0.795*** (0.029) 
Year06 0.100*** (0.004) 0.129*** (0.004) 0.269*** (0.029) 0.140*** (0.030) 
Year07 0.064*** (0.004) 0.092*** (0.004) 0.300*** (0.032) 0.099*** (0.030) 
Year08 0.039*** (0.004) 0.055*** (0.004) 0.298*** (0.032) -0.035 (0.030) 
Observations 17,784 17,784 5,501 5,501 
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, DemPull, TechOpp and 
Appr across equations (1) and (2) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, DemPull, TechOpp and Appr across equations (3) and 
(4) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. Test of equality of estimated 
coefficients of MarkPower and MarkPowerSq across equations (3) and (4) does not allow us to reject the null 
hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
 
 
Demand pull positively affects both the decision and the intensity of both research and 
development, but its effect is always higher for development activities. Its interquartile 
variation is associated with an increase of 0.7-1.6 percentual points in the probability of 
performing research and 1.8-2.7 percentual points in the probability of performing 
development. For those firms active in both activities, the interquartile variation is 
associated with an increase of 22-27% of research expenses per employee and an 
increase of 28-33% of development expenses per employee.  
Technological opportunity positively affects the probability of performing research, and 
its interquartile variation is associated with an increase of 0.8-1.6 percentual points of 
this probability. However, this variable has no effect on development decisions. For 
those performing both activities, technological opportunity has a positive and significant 
effect on both intensities. In this case, the interquartile variation is associated with an 
increase of 20-25% of research expenses per employee and an increase of 11-16% of 
development expenses per employee.  
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Finally, appropriability positively affects both the decision and intensity of both 
research and development. However, its effect is much higher for development. Its 
interquartile variation is associated with an increase of 0.2-0.9 percentual points in the 
probability of performing research and 1.1-1.8 percentual points in the probability of 
performing development. For those doing both activities, the interquartile variation is 
associated with an increase of 19-24% of research expenses per employee and an 
increase of 31-36% of development expenses per employee.  
As we did for the basic specification, we analyze the robustness of these results to the 
use of alternative measures for demand pull, technology opportunity and 
appropriability. Table 5 shows the results for the determinants of research and 
development decisions, while Table 6 focuses on intensities. 
Firstly, regarding the effects of demand pull, the alternative measure used for this 
variable has a positive effect on both the decision and the intensities. This effect is 
slightly higher for development expenditures: an interquartile variation of demand pull 
increases likelihood of performing research by 2.2-3.1 percentual points and increases 
the research expenses per employee by 33-38%, while it increases likelihood of 
performing development by 2.3-3.2 percentual points and the development expenses per 
employee by 35-40%. 
Secondly, the alternative measure employed for technological opportunity shows that 
belonging to a high-tech sector increases the probability of performing research by 8-11 
percentual points and increases the research expenses per employee by 94-108%. Also, 
this variable increases the probability of performing development by 1-4 percentual 
points and development expenses per employee by 92-106%. 
Finally, results for the alternative measure used for appropriability present some 
differences. Interestingly, this variable has a negative effect on the decision of 
performing research activities. This result suggests that a strong patent protection may 
act as a barrier to this type of activity. However, this variable has a positive effect on 
development decisions. In this case, the interquartile variation of this indicator is 
associated with an increase by 2.4-3.5 percentual points in the probability of performing 
development activities. When analyzing research and development intensities, we find 
that this variable has a positive effect on both intensities, although this effect is higher 
in the case of development intensity. Specifically, the interquartile variation is 
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associated with an increase of 10-16% of research expenses per employee and an 
increase of 17-23% of development expenses per employee. 
5.3. Additional robustness checks 
We apply two additional robustness checks to verify our results. Firstly, we test the 
sensibility of our results to the exclusion of firms belonging to industries (at 4-digit 
NACE) with few observations per year. In doing this, we drop firms belonging to 
industries with less than 5 observations.14 Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 1 show the 
results for the basic model and two-part model, respectively. We find that the results are 
very similar to those presented before, with one exception for the first part in the 
research equation. In this case, we find that appropriability has a negative, although not 
significant, effect on the research decision.15 
Secondly, so far, we have considered both occasional and continuous R&D performers 
in our analysis. We have controlled for this fact including a dummy variable identifying 
continuous R&D performers in our estimates. Now, we test the sensibility of our results, 
restricting our attention to the sub-sample of continuous R&D performers. Tables A3 
and A4 in Appendix 1 show the results for the basic model and two-part model, 
respectively. The main conclusion is that differences between the determinants of 
research and development hold, and, in some cases, these differences are more 
important. However, we find that the magnitude of coefficients is, in general, lower. In 
fact, we find that demand pull no longer has a significant effect on research decisions, 
while technological opportunity is not significant for development.16 
 
 
                                                 
14 449 observations are deleted. 
15 Results (not reported here but available upon request) using the alternative variables show that the 
negative and significant effect of the percentage of firms having applied for patents (variable Appr_b) on 
research holds in this subsample. 
16 Results (not reported here but available upon request) using the alternative variables show that the 
negative and significant effect of the percentage of firms having applied for patents (variable Appr_b) on 
research holds in this subsample. 
21 
 
Table 5. Determinants of research and development. Two part model: Determinants of R and D decisions 
 Alternative variable for Demand Pull Alternative variable for Technological Opportunity  Alternative variable for Appropriability 
 RDec 
(1) 
DDec 
(2)
RDec 
(3)
DDec 
(4)
RDec 
(5)
DDec 
(6)
Size 0.081*** (0.007) 0.046*** (0.007) 0.103*** (0.007) 0.059*** (0.007) 0.108*** (0.007) 0.061*** (0.007) 
SizeSq -0.005*** (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
MarkPower -0.026*** (0.006) 0.018*** (0.006) -0.020*** (0.006) 0.020*** (0.006) -0.024*** (0.006) 0.020*** (0.006) 
MarkPowerSq 0.002*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
DemPull   0.056*** (0.018) 0.163*** (0.018) 0.099*** (0.018) 0.157*** (0.018) 
DemPull_b 0.156*** (0.013) 0.159*** (0.013)    
TechOpp 0.122*** (0.023) 0.001 (0.023)   0.142*** (0.023) 0.004 (0.023) 
TechOpp_b   0.092*** (0.008) 0.029*** (0.008)  
Appr 0.020* (0.011) 0.078*** (0.011) 0.023** (0.011) 0.080*** (0.011)  
Appr_b     -0.037** (0.018) 0.192*** (0.018) 
ContR&D 0.321*** (0.006) 0.377*** (0.005) 0.317*** (0.006) 0.376*** (0.005) 0.325*** (0.006) 0.377*** (0.005) 
Year06 0.101*** (0.004) 0.131*** (0.004) 0.100*** (0.004) 0.129*** (0.004) 0.101*** (0.004) 0.122*** (0.004) 
Year07 0.069*** (0.004) 0.096*** (0.004) 0.064*** (0.004) 0.092*** (0.004) 0.065*** (0.004) 0.089*** (0.004) 
Year08 0.044*** (0.004) 0.059*** (0.004) 0.039*** (0.004) 0.055*** (0.004) 0.041*** (0.004) 0.055*** (0.004) 
Observations 17,784 17,784 17,784 17,784 17,784 17,784 
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, TechOpp and Appr across equations (1) and (2) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of 
equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. Test of equality of estimated coefficients of DemPull_b across equations (1) and (2) does not allow us to reject the null hypotheses of 
equality of coefficients. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, DemPull, TechOpp_b and Appr across equations (3) and (4) allow us to reject the null 
hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, DemPull, TechOpp_b and Appr_b across equations (5) and (6) allow us to reject the 
null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 (Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, TechOpp_b and Appr_b) and the 0.05 (DemPull) levels. 
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Table 6. Determinants of research and development. Two part model: Determinants of R and D intensities  
 Alternative variable for Demand Pull Alternative variable for Technological Opportunity  Alternative variable for Appropriability 
 RIntc 
(1) 
DIntc 
(2)
RIntc 
(3)
Dint 
(4)
RInt 
(5)
Dint 
(6)
Size 2.012*** (0.041) 1.833*** (0.041) 2.198*** (0.039) 1.930*** (0.040) 2.307*** (0.039) 2.152*** (0.039) 
SizeSq -0.219*** (0.004) -0.199*** (0.004) -0.236*** (0.004) -0.207*** (0.004) -0.245*** (0.004) -0.227*** (0.004) 
MarkPower 0.155*** (0.032) 0.207*** (0.032) 0.245*** (0.032) 0.323*** (0.032) 0.195*** (0.033) 0.274*** (0.032) 
MarkPowerSq -0.021*** (0.003) -0.023*** (0.003) -0.029*** (0.003) -0.033*** (0.003) -0.028*** (0.003) -0.032*** (0.003) 
DemPull   1.530*** (0.105) 2.090*** (0.104) 1.916*** (0.105) 2.390*** (0.103) 
DemPull_b 2.089*** (0.074) 2.181*** (0.074)     
TechOpp 2.288*** (0.124) 1.286*** (0.123)   2.531*** (0.125) 1.646*** (0.123) 
TechOpp_b    1.210*** (0.067) 1.829*** (0.068)   
Appr 1.163*** (0.067) 1.839*** (0.068) 1.010*** (0.034) 0.990*** (0.034)   
Appr_b   0.819*** (0.101) 1.276*** (0.099) 
ContR&D 0.744*** (0.029) 0.752*** (0.029) 0.745*** (0.029) 0.731*** (0.029) 0.806*** (0.029) 0.802*** (0.029) 
Year06 0.314*** (0.029) 0.231*** (0.029) 0.287*** (0.029) 0.149*** (0.030) 0.254*** (0.030) 0.101*** (0.030) 
Year07 0.366*** (0.032) 0.195*** (0.030) 0.315*** (0.031) 0.119*** (0.030) 0.298*** (0.032) 0.091*** (0.030) 
Year08 0.357*** (0.032) 0.050* (0.030) 0.292*** (0.032) -0.032 (0.030) 0.324*** (0.032) -0.013 (0.030) 
Observations 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501 5,501
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, TechOpp and Appr across equations (1) and (2) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at 
the 0.01 level. Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of MarkPower, MarkPowerSq and DemPull_b across equations (1) and (2) do not allow us to reject the null 
hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, DemPull and Appr across equations (3) and (4) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of 
coefficients at the 0.01 (Size, SizeSq, DemPull and Appr) and the 0.05 (MarkPower)  levels. Test of equality of estimated coefficients of MarkPowerSq and TechOpp_b across 
equations (3) and (4) does not allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, DemPull, TechOpp and Appr_b across equations (5) and (6) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of 
equality of coefficients at the 0.01 (Size, SizeSq,  DemPull,  TechOpp and Appr_b) and the 0.05 (MarkPower) levels. Test of equality of estimated coefficients of 
MarkPowerSq across equations (5) and (6) does not allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to jointly analyze the role played by the different R&D 
determinants found in the literature in driving research and development, accounting for 
the differences between both activities. 
We find that, when research and development are differentiated and the Schumpeterian 
determinants are analyzed together with the more fundamental determinants of R&D 
(demand pull, technological opportunity and appropriability), empirical results become 
more conclusive.  
The effect of firm size depends on the analysis performed. In this case, it is crucial to 
distinguish between the “performance” decision and the “intensity” decision. Firm size 
has a positive and significant effect on the decision of investing in both research and 
development. However, its effect on the intensity of the investment (for those firms 
active in these activities) shows a U-inverted relationship. The effect of market power is 
found to be quite low in both research and development, in line with most of the results 
from previous empirical literature. Regarding their differentiated effect on research and 
development, results show that effect of size and market power is usually higher on 
development than on research. This result agrees with the theoretical results that large, 
oligopolistic firms gain relatively more from incremental and safer projects (Rosen, 
1991; Cabral, 2003; Cohen, 2010). 
Demand pull shows higher effects (coefficients are usually doubled in size) in driving 
development than research, although both investments are sensitive to demand pull. 
This result highlights the fact that development is more focused on adapting knowledge 
to user needs and allows for quicker answers to market demands (Leifer and Triscari, 
1987; Barge-Gil and López, 2011). 
Regarding technological opportunity, we find that this variable has a much higher effect 
on research (coefficients tripled in size) suggesting that research is crucial to benefit 
from such opportunities, in line with arguments provided by the absorptive capacity 
theory (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) 
Finally, appropriability shows a positive effect in driving development. However, its 
relationship with research is not clear. On the one hand, the decision to perform research 
may be negatively affected by appropriability. This is specially the case when legal 
appropriability is analyzed. On the other hand, research intensity is however positively 
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affected by appropriability. These results shed some light on debates from previous 
theoretical and empirical literature. Some authors have warned against the potential 
damaging effects of higher appropriability on R&D (Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Kwon; 
2012). Our results are consistent with their arguments. We contribute to the literature by 
showing that the negative effect of appropriability on R&D arises from its negative 
influence on the likelihood of performing research activities. As Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) have highlighted, if innovation is cumulative and patent rights are very strong, 
firms are concerned about being held up by external patent owners so that they engage 
in patent portfolio races and use patent counts as the unit of currency. That is, only 
firms with “deep pockets” are able to conduct research activities. This logic could 
explain why the likelihood of performing research activities is lower when legal 
appropriability increases while research intensity is still positively affected.  
In this paper, we contribute to the empirical literature on innovation by improving our 
understanding of the forces driving research and development in industry. In addition, 
our results are helpful for policy design aiming at define initiatives to encourage these 
activities. More precisely, our results highlight the potential of demand policies to 
increase development expenses and of supply policies to increase research expenses, 
while casting some doubts on the role of the patent system to foster research activities. 
This work is not without limitations which also constitute opportunities for future 
research. First, our sample is composed of R&D performers. It would be interesting to 
extend these results to a broader sample of firms. Unfortunately, our database does not 
allow us to properly deal with this selection issue. Second, we analyze the Spanish case, 
where a low degree of R&D intensity is combined with a high relative orientation to 
research (Barge-Gil and López, 2011). Evidence from other countries on the 
differentiated determinants of research and developed might help to develop more 
general empirical evidence.17 Third, how the different determinants of research and 
development interact is an unexplored issue which deserves further research. 
                                                 
17 Although previous research using CIS data finds that results for Spain do not seem to be different from 
the results for other European countries (see Griffith et al., 2006, for evidence on the relationship between 
innovation and productivity, and Abramovsky et al., 2009, for evidence on the determinants of co-
operative innovative activity). 
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Appendix 1. Additional results 
 
Table A1. Determinants of research and development intensities 
Basic specification. Robustness check 1
 RInt 
(1)
Dint 
(2)
Size 0.790*** (0.045) 0.452*** (0.056) 
SizeSq -0.083*** (0.005) -0.036*** (0.007) 
MarkPower -0.146*** (0.037) 0.087* (0.047) 
MarkPowerSq 0.010** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.005) 
DemPull 0.859*** (0.136) 1.996*** (0.153) 
TechOpp 3.618*** (0.172) 0.638*** (0.200) 
Appr 0.187** (0.086) 0.836*** (0.090) 
ContR&D 2.549*** (0.030) 3.075*** (0.044) 
Year06 0.736*** (0.030) 0.896*** (0.029) 
Year07 0.435*** (0.029) 0.627*** (0.028) 
Year08 0.295*** (0.029) 0.375*** (0.029) 
Observations 17,335 17,335 
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, 
MarkPowerSq, DemPull, TechOpp and Appr across equations (1) and (2) 
allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 
level. 
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Table A2. Determinants of research and development 
Two part model. Robustness check 1
 Determinants of R and D decisions Determinants of R and D intensities 
 RDec 
(1) 
DDec 
(2) 
RInt 
(3) 
Dint 
(4) 
Size 0.120*** (0.006) 0.067*** (0.007) 1.957*** (0.057) 1.777*** (0.058) 
SizeSq -0.010*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.211*** (0.006) -0.189*** (0.006) 
MarkPower -0.025*** (0.005) 0.009 (0.006) 0.334*** (0.048) 0.309*** (0.049) 
MarkPowerSq 0.002*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.041*** (0.005) -0.036*** (0.005) 
DemPull 0.032* (0.018) 0.185*** (0.020) 3.014*** (0.163) 3.546*** (0.165) 
TechOpp 0.286*** (0.023) 0.011 (0.026) 3.716*** (0.197) 2.179*** (0.200) 
Appr -0.011 (0.011) 0.071*** (0.012) 1.445*** (0.108) 2.176*** (0.109) 
ContR&D 0.326*** (0.004) 0.374*** (0.006) 0.699*** (0.041) 0.714*** (0.042) 
Year06 0.103*** (0.004) 0.128*** (0.004) 0.151*** (0.038) 0.086** (0.038) 
Year07 0.064*** (0.004) 0.090*** (0.004) 0.197*** (0.038) 0.145*** (0.039) 
Year08 0.039*** (0.004) 0.053*** (0.004) 0.186*** (0.038) 0.094** (0.039) 
Observations 17,335 17,335 5,348 5,348 
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPower, MarkPowerSq, DemPull, TechOpp and 
Appr across equations (1) and (2) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, DemPull, TechOpp and Appr across equations (3) and 
(4) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. Test of equality of estimated 
coefficients of MarkPower and MarkPowerSq across equations (3) and (4) does not allow us to reject the null 
hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
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Table A3. Determinants of research and development intensities 
Basic specification. Robustness check 2
 RInt 
(1) 
Dint 
(2) 
Size 1.893*** (0.081) 1.748*** (0.077) 
SizeSq -0.187*** (0.009) -0.180*** (0.009) 
MarkPower 0.196*** (0.066) 0.418*** (0.062) 
MarkPowerSq -0.026*** (0.006) -0.041*** (0.006) 
DemPull 0.145 (0.129) 1.276*** (0.124) 
TechOpp 0.691*** (0.170) 0.189 (0.162) 
Appr 0.179** (0.088) 0.614*** (0.085) 
Year06 0.093*** (0.032) 0.190*** (0.031) 
Year07 0.051 (0.032) 0.142*** (0.031) 
Year08 0.082** (0.032) 0.108*** (0.031) 
Observations 8,984 8,984 
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of MarkPower, DemPull, TechOpp 
and Appr across equations (1) and (2) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of 
equality of coefficients at the 0.01 (DemPull and Appr), the 0.05 
(MarkPower) and the 0.10 (TechOpp) levels. Test of equality of estimated 
coefficients of Size, SizeSq and MarkPowerSq across equations (1) and (2) 
does not allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
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Table A4. Determinants of research and development 
Two part model. Robustness check 2
 Determinants of R and D decisions Determinants of R and D intensities 
 RDec 
(1) 
DDec 
(2) 
RInt 
(3) 
Dint 
(4) 
Size 0.247*** (0.010) 0.231*** (0.010) 2.441*** (0.054) 2.216*** (0.055) 
SizeSq -0.022*** (0.001) -0.021*** (0.001) -0.251*** (0.005) -0.227*** (0.006) 
MarkPower 0.015* (0.008) 0.042*** (0.008) 0.331*** (0.046) 0.387*** (0.047) 
MarkPowerSq -0.002** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.042*** (0.004) -0.044*** (0.004) 
DemPull 0.001 (0.017) 0.123*** (0.016) 1.700*** (0.106) 2.165*** (0.108) 
TechOpp 0.048** (0.022) -0.010 (0.021) 1.883*** (0.139) 1.066*** (0.142) 
Appr 0.011 (0.011) 0.052*** (0.011) 0.893*** (0.078) 1.283*** (0.080) 
Year06 0.015*** (0.004) 0.031*** (0.004) 0.184*** (0.035) 0.115*** (0.035) 
Year07 0.011*** (0.004) 0.025*** (0.004) 0.114*** (0.035) 0.062* (0.035) 
Year08 0.010** (0.004) 0.017*** (0.004) 0.105*** (0.035) 0.042 (0.036) 
Observations 8,984 8,984 3,924 3,924 
Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of MarkPower, DemPull and Appr across equations (1) and (2) allow us 
to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 (DemPull), the 0.05 (Appr) and the 0.10 
(MarkPower) levels. Test of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, MarkPowerSq and TechOpp across 
equations (1) and (2) does not allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
Tests of equality of estimated coefficients of Size, SizeSq, DemPull, TechOpp and Appr across equations (3) and 
(4) allow us to reject the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients at the 0.01 level. Test of equality of estimated 
coefficients of MarkPower and MarkPowerSq across equations (3) and (4) does not allow us to reject the null 
hypotheses of equality of coefficients. 
 
 
